Five scenarios.

Each one is named after a vehicle crash test and simulates one way a protocol can lose depositors' money. All run on a mainnet fork.

5Scenarios3Possible results0Test transactions on mainnet

Depositor Protection

Frontal Drain

The head-on crash. Something drives straight at the vault and tries to get through the front.

Setup. Run the common attack classes against the contracts: reentrancy, rounding and precision, access control, flash loans, and donation attacks.

HELDNo user funds lost

DEGRADEDLoss under 0.5% of TVL, or the attack needs unrealistic capital

FAILEDLoss of 0.5% of TVL or more

VLTIncludes failure of downstream strategies

BRGIncludes forged messages

Depositor Protection

Pole Test

The narrow impact. All the force lands on one small point: a single key.

Setup. Assume one privileged key (admin, owner, or one signer) is leaked or misused.

HELDCannot move funds or change critical parameters without a timelock of 48 hours or more and other signers

DEGRADEDCan change parameters with a timelock under 48 hours

FAILEDCan move funds or upgrade instantly

VLTIncludes the strategist key

BRGA validator or relayer set compromised below its threshold

Market Stress

Side Impact

The hit from an angle nobody watches. The price feed is pushed sideways.

Setup. Move the oracle price by 30% in either direction for one block, or through a flash loan on the source pool.

HELDNo bad debt and no wrongful liquidations

DEGRADEDBad debt under 1% of TVL

FAILEDBad debt of 1% of TVL or more

LNDUses the largest collateral by TVL

DEXMeasured as LP loss from the manipulation

Market Stress

Rollover

The car tips over. One asset loses its footing and drags the rest with it.

Setup. The main collateral or stablecoin depegs to 0.80 for six hours.

HELDBad debt under 0.5% of TVL, liquidations keep running

DEGRADEDBad debt of 0.5 to 3% of TVL

FAILEDBad debt of 3% of TVL or more, or the pause mechanism fails

LNDUses the largest collateral by TVL

Exit & Liquidity

Rear Impact

Hit from behind by everyone at once: the run for the exit.

Setup. 30% of TVL is withdrawn within 24 hours by many addresses.

HELDAll withdrawals processed, slippage under 1%

DEGRADEDA queue of up to 72 hours, or slippage of 1 to 5%

FAILEDWithdrawals blocked for over 72 hours, or slippage over 5%

DEXLPs withdraw 30% of liquidity

BRGMass withdrawals on the destination side

Privacy · PRV

How the five crashes land on a privacy protocol

A shielded pool has no oracle to push sideways. The same five scenarios are re-pointed at what a privacy protocol actually holds: proof circuits, a trusted setup, ring authorities and a shared state tree.

Scenario	On a privacy protocol (PRV)
Frontal Drain	Attempts to withdraw more than was deposited: double-spends, invalid proofs, replayed notes.
Pole Test	One privileged key is misused: program upgrade authority, or a ring authority's freeze and policy powers.
Side Impact	The off-chain helpers are pushed sideways: prover or indexer unavailable or returning wrong data. Can users still exit?
Rollover	One part fails and drags the rest: all rings share one state tree, so a fault in one ring is tested against the others.
Rear Impact	30% of deposited value withdraws to public balances within 24 hours.

A protocol is scored on the same four areas as every other class. Stars stay empty until a Crash Report is signed. See the current queue.